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Abstract
Discipline and Punish has been the seminal text for students of the rationality of disciplinary power. 
In recent years, critical scholarship has become increasingly keen to move analytically beyond 
the normative mode of disciplinary power. As such, D&P is increasingly marginalized as a text, in 
favour of Foucault’s later works. In this discursive context, this paper has a twofold aim. Firstly, I 
want to think through the transformations in labour control over the last 30 years of neoliberal 
counterrevolution in terms of the movement beyond disciplinary power. Secondly, I shall critique 
the autonomous and normative governmentality concept by the reinsertion of the ‘genealogy 
of capital’ in terms of the ontology of axiomatic capitalism. I shall address the undertreated 
genealogical movement from disciplinarity to governmentality, by arguing for something provisionally 
tagged meta-disciplinarity. The worth of such a move is to challenge the critical potency of the 
governmentality concept as is, in the belief that the ‘meta-disciplinary’ offers the most promising 
and relevant ligature from Foucault’s work into Marxist scholarship on the transformations of 
neoliberal capitalism and the technologies of its megamachine that confronts us 40 years on.
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Introduction: Beyond Discipline
Discipline and Punish has obviously been the seminal text for students of the rationality of discipli-
nary power. In recent years, Foucauldian scholarship has become increasingly keen to move intel-
lectually beyond the disciplinary as ‘a place that we have already ceased to be’ by the last decade of 
the 20th century (Deleuze, 1992). The growing interest in the governmentality of the Collège de 
France lectures (Foucault, 2007, 2010) has led to a belief that ‘contemporary mechanisms of gov-
ernment, regulation and administration must be understood as operating according to different log-
ics than the classic “normative” mode of “disciplinary” power’ (New Formations, 2014).
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This is hardly surprising given the swift intellectual dismissal of disciplinarity by Foucault and 
his disciples as an inexcusable continuation of the discourse of ‘repression’ (Behrent, 2010: 589–99; 
Pasquino, 1993: 79), in favour of more exploratory analyses of ‘power’ as ‘actions upon actions’ 
(Foucault, 2002b: 340). In their rush to promote the opportunity offered by the notion of govern-
mental power to get beyond a ’68 obsession with repression, Ewald, Pasquino, and others, have 
clearly therefore been eager to see in discipline an unambiguously oppressive and pessimistic 
modality and to ignore its potentiality, especially if viewed dialectically or even sublatively.
A rethinking of the relation between discipline and government seems in order. Therefore, I am 
chiefly concerned here with thinking through the relation between sovereignty, disciplinarity, and 
governmentality regarding the social metabolism of the biopolitical community. In particular, I 
want to rethink how disciplinarity relates to governmentality in a genealogy of power modalities, 
in order to apprehend critically the conditions of individual and collective reproduction in that 
social metabolism. I want to do this with two broad critical objects in mind: (1) to question the 
critical versatility and utility of the governmentality concept minus capital; and (2) to reconsider 
the now dominant assumption of liberation in the movement out of the disciplinary idiom into that 
of biopolitical government.
In this context, this analysis has emerged from a more specific and focused desire to understand 
the current transformations in the ‘disciplinary technology of labour’ (Foucault, 2003: 242), which 
have become so evidently enforced by neoliberal counterrevolution since the 1980s. In particular, 
it is with the transfiguration of academic life and labouring that I have been chiefly concerned, that 
is, with the new governing of academic life and its technical operative logic that seems to lie some-
where beyond the disciplinary and that is constitutive of the ‘society of control’ (Deleuze, 1992). I 
therefore am concerned simultaneously with understanding a specific phenomenon and critical 
object, yet through a more theoretical exploration of the relation between discipline and govern-
ment in Foucault’s thought and the intellectually critical aporia that has been generated around that 
relation.
The way I want to present this relation is through the notion of meta-disciplinarity,1 or rather 
‘meta-disciplinary techniques’, towards the government of selves and populations in the biopoliti-
cal community. In this way, meta-disciplinarity, whilst broadly remaining within the rationality of 
discipline, brings out those practices and techniques that act as ligature between the docility, iner-
tia, enclosure, of a disciplinarity seemingly without telos or aetia, and a biopolitical idiom of 
government predicated on an ontology of flux, mobility, and speed. This is an attempt to fill a 
puzzlingly unattended void between discipline and government in Foucauldian critical theorizing 
that increasingly denies us the tools to engage in effective daily counter-conducts. My aim is to 
challenge the assumption that there is no material discontinuity on the continuum of micro- and 
macro-physicality (Gordon, 1991: 4), whilst following the analytical proscription to consider prac-
tices as much as institutions, and to offer instead the meta-disciplinary as a decisive moment of 
‘re-continuity’ on the continuum.
For this critical theorizing of immediate and tangible conditions in the biopolitical population, 
upon and with which the modality of government is principally occupied, it appears necessary to 
reinsert something akin to that ‘genealogy of capital’ which Pasquale Pasquino, amongst others, 
has been so keen to divorce from any scrutiny of ‘technologies of power’ (1991: 107). It is only by 
returning to Discipline and Punish in light of the governmentality lectures that the meta-discipli-
nary can be discerned, particularly toward the end of that work, and a new agenda of resonating 
critique in governmentality analyses possibly be opened up. The way we tend to operate intertextu-
ally within a given corpus is either to perceive an ‘anticipation’ of later ideas and themes in earlier 
works, or to see the deficits of earlier works in light of later works (Skinner, 2002). This has led to 
History of Sexuality 1 rising to the position of ground-breaking pivot in the oeuvre, and Discipline 
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and Punish being marginalized as a last gasp of ‘the early works’. Thus we get the latent assump-
tion that a ‘linking of the “microphysics” to the “macrophysics” of power’ via the ‘governmentali-
sation of power techniques’ is something that ‘the problematic of discipline had sidelined’ (Behrent, 
2010: 600). However, I want to show how Discipline and Punish remains the vital ligature in 
Foucault’s corpus for the drawing out of the ‘meta-disciplinary’, along with Psychiatric Power 
(2006) and the last lecture in the Society Must Be Defended series (2003).
Therefore, far from offering another addition to the almost medieval scholasticism into which 
Foucault studies is increasingly sliding, with its deepening seduction into the coherence of a dis-
course and its intellectual incests, there is a more radically immediate critical object at stake here 
beyond the appearance of dry academic parsing. The agenda behind this articulation of the meta-
disciplinary is to derive a theoretically informed, yet technical, understanding of how a disciplinary 
technology of labour is being transformed in terms of capitalist imperatives in the biopolitical 
community, and what might therefore be the most appropriate and efficacious forms of resistance 
and counter-conduct within it, given the rapidly dissolving critical potency of the governmentality 
agenda as it stands.
A Meta-Disciplinary Technology of Labour?
Questions of labour throughout the modern history of homo faber are undoubtedly bound to 
Foucault’s ‘great carceral continuum’ (1991a: 297) and, as I shall argue, the one cannot be under-
stood without consideration of the exigencies and modes of the other. At the heart of the problem 
of social reproduction in the materialist understanding of social metabolism lies the problem of 
labour, how it is obtained socially, and how it is tasked. In short, considerations of the carceral must 
allude somewhere to the ‘disciplinary technology of labour’ (Foucault, 2003: 242).
As our working conditions have been transformed over the last three decades through the neo-
liberal strategies of deindustrialization, financialization, dispersed production regimes, debt-
fuelled consumption, unemployment, monopoly-rent seeking, etc., there seems to be a sense that 
those who labour or reproduce in the mode of production are being drawn into ‘a nightmare of a 
different kind, in which the horrors of force, violence, physical coercion and hardship are replaced 
by the slow suffocation of the spirit, the intellect and the capacity to resist’ (Evans, 2004: 52). 
There are many things at work here, but in terms of the disciplinary technology of labour – those 
technical ways and means of actually stimulating labour and extracting its product from workers 
– there is clearly a movement away from the sites and techniques of disciplinary power that so 
epitomized the industrial society and its apotheosis in the factory, and beyond the orthopaedic 
disciplinarity of scientific management and its Taylorist principles of microphysical somatic coer-
cion (Hardt, 2008: 8). In short, in the context of advanced or axiomatic capitalism this is a strategic 
movement in the operations of labour discipline away from the creation of ‘docile bodies’ and 
toward that of ‘proactive bodies’, or perhaps ‘proactive souls’.
The task ahead is to ruminate on how the transformation of labour discipline over the last few 
decades, and the intellectual line taken in governmentality studies, might not turn out to be that 
sanguine liberation from the constraints of a much maligned disciplinary power claimed by neolib-
eral apologists (Ewald, 1986: 11; 1991). It is with the moment at which the disciplinary technology 
becomes constitutive of the society of control that we ought to be concerned, as well as with theo-
rizing the technical and practical actualization of the latter’s totalizing logos. This moment can be 
identified and clinched in a movement from the sovereign’s right to ‘take life and let live’ to a 
biopolitical imperative of ‘let die and make live’, a genealogical movement towards a deepening 
and intensifying mobilization of populations and the ‘collective individuals’ that constitute them 
(Foucault, 2007: 42). It is within the population that the governmental form of power takes its 
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shape (Pasquino, 1991: 116), but how does it take its shape in, on, and through that object? Pasquino 
attempted to answer this exact question by reference to ‘a whole cluster of practices and knowl-
edges’ that is simply corralled under the rubric of ‘police’ (1991: 116). However, it is through the 
question of exactly ‘by what means’ the society of control is introduced – the modality of govern-
mental power predicated in the establishment of populations and their ‘collective individuals’ – 
that the ‘practices and techniques’ of the meta-disciplinary is intended to guide us. As this 
governmental rationality is embedded in strategies and practical techniques (Foucault, 2002d: 
416), it is only through analysis of these techniques that the formulation and operation of the soci-
ety of control and its Polizeiwissenschaft can be grasped.
This movement can perhaps be captured in the figurative (yet strikingly concrete and historical) 
movement from the prison to the labour camp. It is in the metastasis of the labour camp that the ele-
ment of meta-disciplinarity can be illuminated, and the emergence of its matrices apprehended. This 
movement can be discerned in Discipline and Punish, though it is only brought to light through ret-
rospective consideration after assimilating the later lectures on governmentality. For Solzhenitsyn in 
the Gulag Archipelago (2007) – a work that greatly influenced Foucault’s agenda in Discipline and 
Punish – the labour camp was a matter entirely different from the prison, and at the centre of this dif-
ference lies ‘the leading idea of the Archipelago – forced labour’ (2007b: 10). Camp was thus derived 
from the motivation ‘to get from the camps as much economic profit and production and labour as 
possible’ (2007b: 392–3). Bruno Bettelheim’s reflective study on his own experiences in Buchenwald 
and Dachau led him to conclude that ‘to spend time in prison does not produce the character changes 
described in [camp]’ (1943: 446). Quintessentially, the camp was an infinitely more effective ‘means 
of producing changes in the prisoners which will make them more useful subjects of the Nazi state’ 
(Bettelheim, 1943: 419). Here we are dealing with the transformation of individual subjectivities for 
the purposes of more ‘useful’ labouring in the biopolitical community. Hold that thought.
Giorgio Agamben has already discussed ‘the camp’ in juridico-political terms as a quintessen-
tially modern paradoxical structural relation in which homo sacer as the object of sovereign power 
is formulated via the generalized technique of ‘the ban’ (Agamben, 1998). I want similarly to 
mobilize the latent elements of camp to be found in Discipline and Punish in a slightly different 
direction: camp as a metonym of capitalist government in the society of control constituted by 
‘meta-disciplinary’ techniques.2 Camp thus remains that ‘nomos of the modern’ (Agamben, 1998: 
166), but in contrast to Agamben’s structuralist anatomy, the ‘meta-disciplinary’ brings out the 
physiology of representation and investment. Opposed to the social anatomy of disciplinarity in 
‘The Prison Industry’ (Solzhenitsyn, 2007a), it is the dynamic social physiology of camp ‘In 
Perpetual Motion’ (Solzhenitsyn, 2007b), with which we are interested when speaking of the meta-
disciplinary. Here we get the sense that the techniques of this physiology are not ‘nondisciplinary’, 
as Foucault gropingly tried to define (2003: 39, 242), but are meta-disciplinary by virtue of their 
being operative in the rationality of discipline, whilst simultaneously being drawn or vectored out 
from the modality of discipline by a line-of-flight constitutive of the biopolitical population accord-
ing to its internal dynamic of imperative accumulation.
The anatomical ‘compact prison model’ has been an institutional site more or less embodying 
the rationality of pure disciplinarity, but extending out through the ‘carceral continuum’ into the 
social body (Foucault, 1991a: 298–9). Institutionally it is imbricated into those complexes and 
rationalities that transform the subjectivities of individuals, and that render their bodies docile and 
inert as part of the process of their social recoding. It is the institutional articulation of that modern 
modality of power that renders folk ‘docile and useful’ (1991a: 305), but that usefulness is only a 
potential usefulness. As I shall argue, the disciplinarity outlined in Discipline and Punish is only a 
preparatory pedagogic moment of social transformation for the individual ‘normalized by compul-
sion’ (1991a: 295), which opens up conditions of possibility and potentiality.
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A problem arises. Prison, and the creation of ‘docile bodies’ in accord with its disciplinary 
rationality, is dogged by a fundamental deficiency. This is a technical problem that Solzhenitsyn 
recognized in the Gulag Archipelago: ‘“poverty and prison … give wisdom”. They do. But – where 
is it to be directed?’ (2007b: 602). The prison might well be effective in recoding subjectivities via 
punitive pedagogy, but it is not productive!3 What is the use of punishment here in terms of the 
social metabolism? It is a type of power that ‘keep[s] people calm without getting anything positive 
from them’ (Foucault, 2006: 127). Thinking along these lines, Foucault was overhasty at the end of 
Discipline and Punish when he regarded
the extreme solidity of the prison, that slight invention that was nevertheless decried from the outset. If it 
had been no more than an instrument of rejection or repression in the service of a state apparatus, it would 
have been easier to alter its more overt forms or to find a more acceptable substitute for it. (1991a: 305, 
emphasis added)
The totalitarian regimes of the 20th century were very swift in finding a substitute, and the axio-
matic of advanced capitalism has gradually deployed the same logic in substitution for the figura-
tive prison: the camp. What we see in the metamorphosis from prison to labour camp is essentially 
a modally accretional shift in the technology of labour control from the disciplinary creation of 
docile bodies to the generation of proactive bodies, from the ‘formation of habits’ to the ‘mobilisa-
tion of energy’ (Rancière, 2012: 31). Thus Foucault was wrong to state that ‘rooted as [prison] was 
in mechanisms and strategies of power, it could meet any attempt to transform it with a great force 
of inertia’ (1991a: 305). The imperatives of accumulation in axiomatic capitalism are more potent 
than the rationality of disciplinarity and its historical-institutional ‘armatures’.
Looking historically at more concrete and obvious instantiations of camp as institution (Gulag, 
Nazi labour camps), rather than merely as nomos, logic, rationality, etc., it is not the simple fact 
that the ‘camps’ have entailed (forced) labour over the (enforced) leisure or idleness of prison that 
is important. It is a matter of how labour-power is obtained and deployed, impelled rather than 
compelled through ‘technologies of the self’ (Foucault, 2000), through apparatuses that cannot be 
sufficiently summarized by reference to anatomical disciplinary power. It has been a striking his-
torical feature of the labour camp that bodily confinement and coercion are less characteristic than 
in the prison setting, and it is in the attempt to address this enigmatic quality in the figurative move 
from prison to camp that the meta-disciplinary becomes pivotal, and a surprising nostalgic affec-
tion for the disciplinary wells up. But what exactly is this meta-disciplinarity?
The Meta-Disciplinary: Unpacking the ‘Dovetailing’
The socio-technological study of the mechanisms of control, grasped at their inception, would have to be 
categorical and to describe what is already in the process of substitution for the disciplinary sites of 
enclosure, whose crisis is already proclaimed. (Deleuze, 1992: 7)
We must get beyond the micro-somatic techniques of disciplinarity that have preoccupied so much 
critical scholarship, and into the so-called ‘power at a distance’ (Gill, 2014: 22) that is so evident 
in the more highly developed semio-techniques of what I call ‘the meta-disciplinary’. The geneal-
ogy of discipline and government is characterized by Foucault not as a step or supersession, but as 
a ‘dovetailing’ (Foucault, 2003: 242). To elaborate and explore this ‘dovetailing’ is to get a handle 
on the meta-disciplinary.
The meta-disciplinary resides in the tangled genealogical relationship between the rationalities of 
‘sovereignty’, ‘discipline’, and ‘government’, and particularly on the threshold between the latter 
34 Critical Sociology 44(1) 
two. Let’s remember that governmentality, ‘governmental rationality’, is that ‘ensemble formed by 
institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics’ (Foucault, 2007: 108). 
As a modality of power it both predicates and generates ‘population as its target, political economy 
as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security [physiological regulation] as its essen-
tial technical instrument’. Beyond the enclosed sites of a disciplinary power actualized via an ana-
tomic-somatic microphysics, government is a power for which ‘population’ is the most germane 
level of life at which its rationality is concerned, and the end for which government itself is con-
ducted as ‘police’ (Foucault, 2007: 21; 2002d: 416). This is that pastoral modality of power opera-
tive in the parametric society of control.
Genealogically this takes us historically from the power of the sovereign, through individuating 
disciplinary power employed somatically and semiotically in panoptic institutions such as the asy-
lum, prison, barracks and school, to the ‘age of security’ and ‘man-as-species’ as the regulated 
object of this governmental power (Foucault, 2003: 242). This is not a historical narrative, but the 
way Foucault moves through the modern modalities of power in his corpus over roughly a decade 
of scholarship. By the time of the lectures the point is that, in contrast to the sovereign’s power that 
characterized the early-modern territorial-fiscal state, a field of activity began to take form in the 
18th century out of the crisis of mercantilism. This field of activity is the ‘economy’ and sits at the 
core of the (neo-)liberal problematic: ‘how the overall exercise of political power can be modelled 
on the principles of a market economy’ and how ‘formal principles of a market economy’ can be 
‘projected on to a general art of government’ (Foucault, 2010: 131). Through innumerable discur-
sive jostlings, the intervention of ‘government’ in the collective life of a ‘population’ (a categorical 
invention of modernity) came to redefine the centrality of the modality of sovereign power, and 
became increasingly the form of political power most relevant to the domain of ‘political economy’ 
to which sovereign power was increasingly counterproductive (literally).
In contrast to the pre-modern society of orders and estates, the abstract modern concept of 
‘population’, as the target of government and object of police administration, was born in moder-
nity twin to the individual (Pasquino, 1991: 114). The chiselling out of the individual from a social 
plane of immanence is not only necessary for a population to exist, but re-enforces its totalizing 
constellation of relations (Foucault, 2002d: 417). Our individuality in this modality binds us more 
intimately to the megamachine. The population must be constituted by the creation of individuals, 
in order for it to be governed and for there to be a field of political economy into and by which 
government can intervene. There is thus required a mereological establishment of individuals 
within the population via a particular coding of the social relations between them, that is, the neces-
sary social ‘depths and details’ (omnes et singulatim) of objectification (Foucault, 1991b: 102). 
Thus, in a way that is enunciative and accretional, rather than a ‘successive unilinear replacement’ 
(Dean, 2003: 117), the role of individuating orthopaedic disciplinary power is retained, augmented, 
and transfigured, within the new mode of ‘government’. This, Foucault made clear in the later 
elaboration of ‘governmentality’ found amongst the lectures:
As for discipline … discipline was never more important or more valorised than at the moment when it 
became important to manage a population; the managing of a population not only concerns the collective 
mass of phenomena, the level of its aggregate effects, it also implies the management of population in its 
depths and its details. (Foucault, 1991b: 101–2; emphasis added)
In the conventional Foucauldian presentation, the decisive change of emphasis in the modality of 
governmental power here is in the move to ever more effective means of achieving and sustaining 
the well-being of the population qua population in an entirely non-prescriptive way and without 
necessary content or definition (Lazzarato, 2015: 109). It is the political reason of the state.
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This great transformation in the modalities of power throughout the 19th and 20th centuries 
means a movement from the sovereign’s right ‘to take life or let live’ to the positive power to 
‘“make” live and “let” die’ that characterizes government of the biopolitical population (Foucault, 
2003: 241). To the individuating disciplinary power that functions to compel, neutralize, obviate, 
disable, threaten, render inert, or exclude into ‘docility’ (passivity and pliancy), must now be added 
the practical techniques that impel, mobilize, operationalize, tease, blackmail, tempt, or incentivize 
the instrumental individual within a population, but which nevertheless continue to coerce in some 
way ‘at a distance’ and with an averted gaze.
What lies before us then, in the emergence of a meta-disciplinary technology of labour, is a 
subtle, yet decisive, transition of emphasis from the gaze of discipline through enclosure, and its 
microphysical technology of coercive force, to the mechanisms of mobilization in the governmen-
tal rationality of the biopolitical community. These devices work not by command or instruction, 
as one might find in the purely disciplinary modality, that is, in the ‘form of the prohibition “you 
must not do this”’ (Foucault, 2007: 66), nor via the sovereign’s ‘imposition of a law that says no’. 
Rather we have a disposition of techniques that inculcate impulsions to achieve, seek reward, gain 
approval, aspire, succeed, advance, excel, by means of ‘representations’ generated by the fluidic 
economy of semio-techniques backed up by particular constellations of material social relations 
between individuated disciplinary subjectivities in a totalizing biopolitical community. This is the 
point at which the generalized punishment ceases to be merely an ‘art of effects’ (Foucault, 1991a: 
93) and becomes an art of affects, drawing out the flow of libidinal investments from individuals.
The objection appears (more further down) if we seriously question the progressive narrative of 
improvement claimed by neoliberals of this pastoral modality of government as some kind of evolu-
tion out of the cage of discipline into the sunlit uplands of transparency, possibility, adventure, and the 
absence of constraint (Ewald, 1986: 11; 1991).4 This very outcome seems to have actually been a 
motivation for Foucault’s agenda in governmentality studies: to furnish a more optimistic exploration 
of power than the depressing doldrums of the disciplinary (Gordon, 1991: 4). Perhaps he was precipi-
tate. Table 1 roughly summarizes the accretional, supplementary, and tangled meta-disciplinary 
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movement in the modality of power that translates discipline in terms of government through a 
‘mutual interpenetration of two strategies’ (Dean, 2003: 117) and transports us from ‘prison’ into 
‘camp’ across the momentary threshold of the meta-disciplinary.
In the governmental rationality, ‘technology’ is to be understood, derived from technē, as a 
‘practical rationality governed by a conscious goal’ (Foucault, 2002c: 364) – but what conscious 
goal? It is an increasingly comprehensive and penetrative goal concerned with ‘the government of 
individuals, the government of souls, the government of the self by the self, the government of 
families, the government of children, and so on’ (Foucault, 2002c: 364; Lemke, 2007: 45). 
Governmental rationality thus entails a new technology of control, which mobilizes the techniques 
of discipline but which ought not to be characterized as simply ‘disciplinary’. As Foucault crucially 
states, ‘this technology of power … does not exclude disciplinary technology, but it does dovetail 
into it, integrate it, modify it to some extent, and above all, use it by sort of infiltrating it, embed-
ding itself in existing disciplinary techniques’ (Foucault, 2003: 242).
The question we have to ask ourselves is how do we get from the isolated and individuated 
‘docile’ body of pure disciplinarity to the proactive collective individual as part of an economy 
of beings capable of being governed? How can we start to get a hook into the elusive generality 
of the society of control and its elementally constitutive moments that emerge as ‘metastable 
states coexisting in one and the same modulation, like a universal system of deformation’ 
(Deleuze, 1992: 5)? These moments are not historically a straightforward product of the disinte-
grations of the post-Fordist era, it should be born in mind, but have been a latent genealogical 
vector of modern capitalist rationality throughout.
In terms of the four ‘technologies’ – matrices of ‘practical reason’ – that Foucault lays out in 
‘Technologies of the Self’ (2000: 225), the disciplinary techniques are clearly those (1) ‘technologies 
of power’ that entail a preparatory ‘objectivizing of the subject’, and which ‘determine the conduct of 
individuals’, but are inadequate as (2) ‘technologies of production’ that allow us ‘to perform, trans-
form, or manipulate things’ according to the dynamic imperative of capital accumulation in the social 
metabolism. It is then by an augmented and perfected (3) ‘technology of sign systems’, drawn out 
from the semio-techniques of representation introduced in Discipline and Punish (1991a: 94, 101–3), 
that the meta-disciplinary is finally realized in full by emergence at the threshold of ‘control’ in (4) 
‘technologies of the self’, by which individuals are permitted to ‘effect by their own means, or with 
the help of others, a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, conduct, 
and way of being, so as to transform themselves’ for production (emphasis added). Thus it is only by 
consideration of all four overlapping and imbricated technologies that a post-disciplinary technology 
of labour in the society of control can be perceived in terms of a social metabolism.5
Meta-disciplinarity is therefore not so much a discretely and coherently different rationality of 
power itself as it is that augmented dimension of disciplinarity particularly constitutive of the 
biopolitical community over and through which government is actualized. The meta-disciplinary 
is then a distinct modality, taking ‘modality’ as a set of techniques related by an isomorphic line 
that runs through them. In the political rationality of the society of control it is those specific tech-
niques that are constitutive of the apparatus of police power (Foucault, 2002d: 416). If ‘discipline’ 
is that pedagogic and punitive moment of transformation in individual subjectivity, ‘meta-disci-
pline’ is that moment of introduction of the disciplined subject into the ‘useful’ productivity of the 
biopolitical community in terms of a materialist social metabolism that takes the subject beyond 
‘disciplinary exigencies’ (Ewald, 1986: 159–60). It is those species of governmental practices that 
draw out the subjectivity of the individual from docility to proactivity in the totalizing creation of 
the biopolitical ‘collective individual’.
As with a bourgeois subjectivity, if the disciplined individual subjectivity is still possessed 
therewith of a transcendent potential, such as in the social solidarity bred of disciplinary 
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normalization (Ewald, 1986: 584), and the democratizing negotiation excited by it as a form of 
knowledge-power (Behrent, 2010: 617), the meta-disciplined ‘collective individual’ is dispos-
sessed of the same by its instrumental canalization and subordination to the governmental impera-
tives of the biopolitical community. If ‘power’ is famously ‘an action upon an action’, regarding 
subjectivized objects that are possessed of at least a minimal agential capacity for personal ethical 
choice and practice (Foucault, 2002b: 340), it could be argued that the violence and coercion of 
institutionally situated disciplinary power disqualifies it as a form of power (Gordon, 1991: 5). Its 
technologies would therefore be not those of power at all, but merely a prescriptive force. However, 
at the risk of ringing out structuralist tones, I argue in the opposite direction. The ‘condition of pos-
sibility’ opened up by the creation of disciplined subjectivities, with all its simultaneous deficits 
and surpluses, insufficient penetrations yet repeated overcodings (Foucault, 1991a: 201), rather 
opens up a paradoxical interstitial space in which all sorts of evasive and affirmatively countervail-
ing ‘practices of the self’ can be pursued. This space is then closed, however, in the moment of 
meta-disciplinarity that canalizes and mobilizes investments under the unitary sign of the biopoliti-
cal community and made immediate by the absolute positivity of its totalizing apparatus of tech-
niques in the society of control.
In the example of the prison, figurative and concrete, there has historically been a great intel-
lectual scope for ‘moral ascent’ through thought and ethically rigorous behaviour such as the 
refusal (refusing to confess, to inform on others, or by keeping mentally active through calculating 
the circumference of the Earth!). There has been a space for ethical practice and Enkrateia, which 
is that modernist Kantian freedom understood as ‘intellectual and moral autonomy’ (Zaretsky, 
2005: 163). Whilst arrival in the zona of camp induces a sense of physical liberation, this is soon 
dispelled as that space is imploded by the meta-disciplinary techniques that swiftly hijack the sub-
ject’s ‘free’ lines of investment and association by means of the governmentality of accumulation. 
Therefore, it is at this meta-disciplinary moment of closure that our critical attentions, and our 
strategies of counter-conduct and resistance, ought perhaps to be focused. For it is here that the 
axiomatic logic of advanced capitalism interpolates and appropriates, and the ‘genealogy of capi-
tal’ returns with a vengeance through the technologies.
Let us consider a couple of instances of meta-disciplinary technique introduced in Discipline 
and Punish and elsewhere, and that can be drawn out from pure disciplinarity. Firstly, there is 
malveillance – that ‘network of permanent observation’ (Foucault, 1991a: 295, emphasis added) 
that takes the form of a kind of heightened panopticism.
In the Panopticon each person, depending on his place, is watched by all or certain of the others. You have 
an apparatus of total and circulating mistrust, because there is no absolute point. The perfected form of 
surveillance consists in a summation of malveillance. (Foucault, 1980: 158)
No longer the lone gaze of the unseen inspector and the denial of any visual horizontality charac-
teristic of the ‘axial visibility’ of pure disciplinarity (Foucault, 1991a: 200). This networked 
malveillance could be discerned in the brigade system of Gulag (Solzhenitsyn, 2007b: 156), just as 
much as in the operations of today’s academic rankings and assessment exercises, and serves well 
as a ligature from pure disciplinary to meta-disciplinary techniques. Camp is not a mere open-air 
panopticon, it is a society of beings, or rather an economy of beings, in which a new improvised 
penal ‘art of government’ has to be established by authority and corresponding ‘practices of the 
self’ have to be conjured by those placed under its logic in order to survive, not merely as bodies, 
but as souls. This is the implicit vision of Foucault’s carceral at the end of Discipline and Punish 
where he introduced in the last few pages a connection of disciplinarity to government by recogniz-
ing in the carceral an ‘apparatus of punishment that conforms most completely to the new economy 
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of power’ (1991a: 305). It is the ‘power of colonization: putting people to work … divided into 
squads and brigades’, a kind ‘ergotherapy’, as in the case of the asylum, distinct from the tradi-
tional disciplinary power of ‘simple penning’ (Foucault, 2006: 127). The movement from the pano-
ptic inspector of the disciplinary to the physiologic ‘malveillance’ of the collective at least hints at 
the ligature to government that I claim of meta-disciplinary techniques and practices.
A second exemplary technique is ‘limitless postponement’ (Deleuze, 1992: 5). In camp this 
has taken the form of the ‘differentiated ration pot’ – the distribution of supplementary food 
amongst the camp labourers conceived with the sole purpose of incentivizing percentages of 
output above 100% of the norm (Solzhenitsyn, 2007b: 155). The ‘differentiated ration pot’ 
makes clear how the impulsion to labour as a result of limitless postponement of return is imma-
nent to the anatomical structure and physiological systemic relations of the meta-disciplinary 
technology of labour. For instance, it is limitless postponement of remuneration, promotion, and 
security of position that incentivizes labourers on the eternally postponed promise of supernor-
mal remuneration. Like the prospect of early release from Gulag based on compliant behaviour, 
such promises are rarely kept. In fact, they cannot be kept by definition in the regime of differ-
entially enforced scarcity so necessary for primitive accumulations to be possible in the axio-
matic of capitalism (Harvey, 1972: 9). However, labour pursuant of ‘the big ration’, under 
endlessly postponed conditions of remuneration and security, mines our personal and most inti-
mate dedications and ‘eat[s] people alive’ (Solzhenitsyn, 2007b: 155): ‘in camp it is not the 
small ration that kills but the big one’ (2007b: 208).
Here we see in those techniques generative of the proactive collective individual of the biopo-
litical community – the augmented malveillance of a refined principle of panopticism and the 
limitless postponement of the ‘differentiated ration pot’ – the apparatuses (dispositives) on which 
government of populations must rest and make its interventions. They take us from a static technol-
ogy that enforces docility and inertia through coercive enclosure, to a mobilizing horizon of sub-
jectivities amenable to be governed dynamically as epitomized in Discipline and Punish by the 
carceral.
The carceral makes it possible to carry out the great ‘economy’ of power whose formula the eighteenth 
century had sought, when the problem of accumulation and useful administration of men first emerged. 
(Foucault, 1991a: 303)
Discipline and Punish introduces the apparatuses of ‘semio-techniques’ (1991a: 128–31), which 
are the basis for the more material meta-disciplinary techniques and that contrast paradoxically 
with the complex of orthopaedic microphysics that has dominated the scholarship. After 
Discipline and Punish there seems to be a movement in critical thinking away from the ‘repre-
sentations of signs’ and the ‘punitive city’ towards a greater emphasis on the somatic techniques 
of coercion and a centring of ‘the body’ in both Foucault’s work and the subsequent industry of 
Foucauldian studies. Meta-disciplinary apparatuses operate through those inductive ‘representa-
tions’ that draw on the dynamic potential of the semio-technical complex of representations 
more than on the micro-political technologies of somatic coercion that remain closer to the plane 
of the purely disciplinary.
A Governable Subjectivity for Capital
From where does the dynamism essential to the continued existence of the biopolitical community 
come – a biopolitical community that must ontologically be dynamic? In order to grasp fully the 
meta-disciplinary transfigurations discussed so far, the imperative logic that drives these practices, 
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and their recurrent emergence in historical time, must be identified. There is an historical asym-
metry here that belies any claim to an internally undifferentiated and normative governmentality of 
life in the biopolitical community as an autonomous sphere of action or homeostatic ‘police’ entity. 
There is a fundamental spatio-temporal motor at work here, driving the individuating function of 
the meta-disciplinary and its mereological apparatuses in a given population, and a logic that 
entails the figurative and real asymmetric destruction of lives in that biopolitical multiplicity in the 
furtherance and successful continuity of Life. That something is axiomatic capitalism.6 This is an 
end to which individuals, in this case ‘collective individuals’, are ‘simply instrumental’ in the final 
analysis (Foucault, 2007: 42).
Since the state is its own finality, and since the governments must have for an exclusive aim not only the 
conservation but also the permanent reinforcement and development of the state’s strengths, it is clear that 
the governments don’t have to worry about individuals … the individual becomes pertinent for the state 
insofar as he can do something for the strength of the state. (Foucault, 2002d: 406)
The rationality of this ‘political marginalization’ of the individual is of a crucially ambiguous 
sort that requires it ‘to live, to work, to produce, to consume; and sometimes what he has to do 
is to die’ (2002d: 406). The normative conceptualization of the biopolitical population usually 
exploited from the lectures presents us with a dubiously homeostatic entity that is symmetrical 
in its totality. It is insufficient (and arguably even reactionary) to suppose a teleological regula-
tion of life in the biopolitical community toward the abstract maintenance of Life itself and the 
simple reproduction of population. This would just be an unstriated plane of consistency, with-
out any dynamic structure or ‘lines of stratification’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 2013: 22), denying 
us any analytical insight into what is happening spatio-temporally. In the governmental ration-
ality, capital is inscribed as a stratum-generating ‘tracing’ on the body-without-organs,7 if you 
will, a phenomenon of accumulation and extraction of useful labour (Deleuze and Guattari, 
2013: 184), marking spatially and generating historically the particularities of its concrete oper-
ations. This is capitalist governmentality.
If discipline be the mode, this then is the motor that drives the individuating function and the 
creation of multiplicity from the unity of the biopolitical population. What establishes the barriers, 
differentials, membranes, and penumbrae that constitute the ‘depths and details’ internal to the 
biopolitical population as a whole? This can be accounted for by the insertion of a capitalist imper-
ative of accumulation that establishes the particular and asymmetric mereonomic configuration of 
identity and difference necessary to generate and regenerate the internal dynamic infrastructure of 
the biopolitical population, and its necessarily differential flows. It is the logic of axiomatic capital-
ism that furnishes the idiomatic ‘depths and details’ by which particularity is chiselled out of gen-
erality, and by which ‘collective individuals’ are marked out as ‘cases’ (Foucault, 1991a: 191–2), 
and without which there would be no dynamism or perpetual motion in the biopolitical population. 
Capitalist logic motivates the dynamic internal structuring of biopolitical government and drives 
its perpetual thirst for ever-more production and growth.
The problem of biopolitical government as it seems to confront us arises when the political 
reason behind the ‘individuating power’ is not that of the pastoral deity and its ‘final kindness’ 
(Foucault, 2002a: 300, 302) but that of capital and the final indifference of its spatio-temporal 
imperatives of perpetual accumulation. This leaves us with a decisive critique of governmentality 
as entailing a sacrificial abandonment of the individual, or rather categories of individuals, in 
accord with the political reason of the biopolitical community determined concretely by the dynam-
ics of capital accumulation and its genealogical autopoetic generation of meta-disciplinary tech-
niques toward this end.
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The practical implications of these meta-disciplinary techniques are that resistances and coun-
ter-conducts must wrestle with a proactivating power. This will necessitate tactical and strategic 
resistances of a different kind to those required in the idiom of pure disciplinarity, and that are 
supposedly not even required in the autonomous sphere of governmentality. We can see how the 
relative ineffectiveness of disciplinarity as a modality of power lies in the surplus entailed in the 
activity of that power as realized through its techniques (Foucault, 1991a: 201). Resistance is 
engendered by this power itself in its operation and realization. Disciplinary power entails a sur-
plus that engenders its own counter-conduct, just as the threat to sovereignty is created in the 
spectacle of public punishment out of its own reflexive challenge in the spectacular judicial act 
itself of sovereign power exercised on the body of the condemned (1991a: 73).
However, in ‘the camp’ we see how any such surplus is swiftly appropriated, redirected, and 
channelled into productive activity, and the private, disputational, or insurrectional moment of 
surplus annihilated. The relative effectiveness of the meta-disciplinary in capitalist governmental-
ity stems from the apparent absence of such a surplus in this modality. As such, resistance to power 
cannot rely upon the surplus of disciplinary power to provoke or establish the terms of resistance. 
A modality of power predicated on ‘proactivity’ must be met with a resistance characterized by a 
heightened sensitivity that takes the initiative and creates the conditions of possibility for its own 
practices of counter-conduct.
In the meta-disciplinary idiom, the materialist ‘soul’ is still the target of techniques as a ‘cor-
relative of a certain technology of power over the body’ (Foucault, 1991a: 29–30). However, it 
is also produced ‘in a more general way’ as ‘the element in which are articulated the effects of a 
certain type of power’ (1991a: 29), a power that derives from the complex of semio-techniques 
and their ‘representations’ (1991a: 101–2). It is a soul that is both ‘effect and instrument of a 
political anatomy’, and political physiology, that also imprisons the body through which is it 
reached. But this meta-discipline projects not those disciplinary representations that strike indi-
viduals into inaction and malleable passivity; they are of a different kind that place individuals 
into more intimate material and social relations ‘at a distance’, drawing out and recording pro-
ductive libidinal investments.
The interiorization of the mechanisms of power through disciplinary micro-physical tech-
niques is therefore merely the first movement of control that secures the ‘collaboration of the 
Self’ in a modality of power ‘diffused and decentred through the social body’ (Federici, 2004: 
149). The discipline of enclosure seems then to be a preparatory and pedagogical moment of 
subjective transfiguration on the way to the modern ‘self-management’ that epitomizes bour-
geois subjectivity (Federici, 2004: 149). It could be argued then that, in contrast to the enclo-
sures of disciplinary power, this movement toward the open economy of camp opens up a space 
of autonomous personal agency. However, such would be to reckon without the accumulation 
imperatives of capitalist social relations, which render the realization of this subjectivity per-
petually imperfect through dynamically structural asymmetries and the canalisations of their 
generative lines-of-flight. The meta-disciplinary moment emerges so as to draw out and aug-
ment the techniques of disciplinarity in the forging of more ‘governable’ individuals, but cer-
tainly not more emancipated individuals, under the suasions of a capitalist logos. It is only by 
the analytic reinsertion of a capitalist dynamic into the mode of governmentality, something 
that comes to light only after reading the lectures on governmentality and then returning to 
Discipline and Punish, that the meta-disciplinary can be discerned as a dimension of the disci-
plinary in Discipline and Punish and other writings.
This is a reformulation of the industrial pathology of capitalism that forces the individual to 
internalize the productive apparatus, moulding the worker’s personality and subjectivity for pur-
poses of command and organization (Virno and Hardt, 1996: 133), resulting in ‘inner immigration’ 
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and self-exploitation (Lorenz, 2012: 620), and the territorialized hijacking of a personal libidinal 
economy subjectivized. One recalls in this capitalist pathology Marx’s ‘manufacturing moment’ 
that ‘converts the worker into a crippled monstrosity by furthering his particular skill as in a forc-
ing-house, through the suppression of a whole world of productive drives and inclinations’ (Marx, 
1990: 481). However, it is not so much a suppression with which we must now reckon as it is a 
formidable mobilization.
The original panopticon of Bentham was conceived on a utilitarian, though retrospectively 
chilling, Enlightenment principle of improvement. The apparatuses of capitalist governmentality 
in the society of control have no such imperative necessarily, and as the memory of the disciplinary 
fades, it is plausible that a ‘nightmare of a new kind’ will increasingly dominate – a biopolitical 
community of expendable ‘collective individuals’ who, if in refusal will not be ‘made live’, will 
rather be ‘let die’.
Such being the case, as prelude to any statement or formulation of ‘practices of resistance’ 
regarding meta-disciplinary techniques, we must at least (and maybe at most) identify and elabo-
rate the practices of control and the idiomatic operative logic by which they are realized. We must 
target those meta-disciplinary sutures that mobilize a transformative pedagogical disciplinary 
moment for the governmental rationality of a police power driven by the asymmetric spatio-tem-
poral imperatives of capital accumulation, and introject our critical energies there.
That is what this paper has attempted, taking the first step toward those practices of resist-
ance which each must determine for themselves. The matter begins with the personal ethical 
practice of the individual. To resist the consigning, placing, and canalizing forces of proactiva-
tion in the techniques of meta-disciplinarity that blackmail us intimately from a distance, it is 
the manifest and exemplary refusal of individuals to play ball, rather than active resistance, 
that is likely most effective. To meet proactivating power as though it were the exercise of 
sovereign or disciplinary power that produces its own surplus of provocation is ultimately 
self-defeating given the suffocating, yet mobile and adaptable, meta-disciplinary and govern-
mental ‘power at a distance’.
Conclusion
So what is the bearing of the meta-disciplinary in the context of this critique of governmentality? 
How does the identification of a moment of decisively meta-disciplinary techniques supply us with 
inspiration for appropriate counter-conduct in the technology of labour control? If ‘power ipso 
facto implies resistance, while acts of resistance always draw upon the power relations in which 
they are embedded’ (Behrent, 2010: 603), it is also true that this resistance cannot be homologous 
to the action of that power. Following this, it seems that both sovereign and disciplinary power 
engender particular surpluses of power (Foucault, 1991a: 201), the former as ‘challenge’ and the 
latter as ‘over-coding’. The sovereign subject revolts at the spectacle of the sovereign’s revenge, 
and seeks the head of the king. The coercions of disciplinary power and its enclosed institutions 
can only be resisted by the physical or figurative ‘escape’ (the truanting pupil, the AWOL patient, 
the prison fugitive, the army deserter, the uncooperative psycho-analysant). These respective strat-
egies of counter-conducted resistance will be ineffective in the meta-disciplinary moment on the 
threshold of the society of control. ‘Rebellion’ is crushed or canalized and ‘escape’ offers merely a 
flight into the totalized zone of biopolitical ban and living death. Identification of the distinctly 
meta-disciplinary moment can possibly lead us to more germane and hence efficacious counter-
conducts. Foremost amongst these strategies is the ‘refusal’: a cunning tendency towards ‘inertia’; 
a tactical resistance to being mobilized and productive; stubbornly clinging to one’s place in the 
tent, but refusing to relieve oneself.
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Notes
1. There is a justification for the prefatory ‘meta’, which will become clear below. It is not simply the crea-
tion of an intellectual commodity by the time-honoured addition of a Greco-Latin prefix, though it never 
hurts.
2. Perhaps the camp, and its operative logic as a ‘peculiarly modern phenomenon’ (Poulantzas, 2014: 107), 
could be treated as a rhizomatically established plateau of its own in the juggled schizophrenia of axi-
omatic capitalism.
3. ‘The same could be said about Taylorism. The system of Taylorism was an extraordinary invention by 
an engineer who wanted to combat laziness and everything that slows down production. But one can still 
ask: did Taylorism ever really work?’ (Foucault, 1980: 162).
4. The sanguine view that Francois Ewald presents of insurance, as a liberating apparatus that makes a pro-
ductive opportunity out of risk hitherto treated as a mere obstacle to activity, is a good example of this. 
Such arguments could be made generally of capitalism; after all, it gets us doing things! It is as though 
after assimilating the first half of The Communist Manifesto on the wonders of capitalism’s energy 
and productivity, one forgets the concomitant exploitations and endless structural asymmetries of The 
Working Day. It is as though worker and capitalist reside equally under an internally symmetrical and 
autonomous governmentality of the population.
5. It should now be clear why the prefix ‘meta-’ is preferable to ‘post-’ regarding discipline. Discipline is 
not left behind, but transfigured.
6. Axiomatic capitalism ought to be taken as something total, but not exhaustive, and something that 
touches everything, but that does not account for everything. This is not an operation that makes ‘histori-
cal capitalism … deducible as the only possible and necessary figure of the logic of capital’ (Foucault, 
2010: 165), but offers a given historical capitalism as a singularity with its own conditions of possibility. 
It is important to lay this out even briefly, in order at least to make the apostolic obsessives pause long 
enough in their denunciations to realize that today’s more protean Marxist thinking can be as onto-
epistemologically sensitive as all-too-often they complacently assume themselves to be.
7. The body-without-organs alludes to ‘a substrate that is also identified as the plane of consistency. It is 
a ‘non-formed, non-organized, non-stratified or destratified body or term’ and is ‘opposed to the organ-
izing principles that structure, define and speak on behalf of the collective assemblage of organs, experi-
ences or states of being’ (Message, 2010: 37–8).
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